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ABSTRACT 
 Effective information sharing between various commands is essential for an 
organization to effectively and efficiently meet the mission. The U.S. Fleet Cyber 
Command/U.S. 10th Fleet (FLTCYBERCOM/C10F) organization, per their home page, 
is composed of more than 14,000 active and reserve Sailors and civilians organized into 
28 active commands, 40 cyber mission force units, and 27 reserve commands around the 
globe. Operators within the organization are charged with providing real-time 
information for decision-makers at all operational levels. In the current and future cyber 
environment, it is fundamentally important for commanders to have real-time information 
at their disposal for decision-making. This thesis has two goals. The first goal is to assess 
whether existing information systems, mandates, policies, or service-level agreements 
(SLAs) are limiting information sharing within the FLTCYBERCOM/C10F organization. 
The second goal is to seek solutions that support current and evolving requirements. 
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This thesis has a primary and secondary purpose. The primary purpose is to 
determine if existing enterprise information systems (EIS), mandates, policies, and 
service-level agreements (SLAs) are impacting U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC)/U.S. 
Tenth Fleet (C10F)’s ability to efficiently share information within its organization by 
ensuring that existing enterprise information systems (EIS), mandates, policies, and 
service-level agreements (SLAs) are performing in the desired manner that promotes 
information sharing. The secondary purpose is to recommend reliable, efficient, and 
secure information systems, mandates, and policy solutions furthering FCC/C10F’s 
ability to effectively execute its mission.  
The Department of the Navy relies on timely information for all operations and 
the ability to analyze and use that information effectively and efficiently in real-time is 
imperative. At the very foundation of efficiently utilizing information, is proper and real-
time information sharing between organizations. Lack of information sharing is typically 
due to various obstacles that may limit an organization’s ability to send, receive and 
process data in real-time. Experts have commented that barriers often prevent 
organizations from being fully interoperable (Chen, 2006). According to Chen, “barriers 
are incompatibilities of various kinds and at various enterprise levels” (Chen, 2006, p. 2). 
A real-world example of this is an operator being unable to provide the real-time status of 
a system or subordinate organization due to specific service-level agreements (SLAs) 
verbiage that does not support 100% data sharing. Information sharing and real-time 
statuses are impossible without the free flow of timely and accurate data.  
FCC’s command mission is, according to their public homepage, to “plan, 
coordinate, integrate, synchronize, direct, and conduct the full spectrum of cyberspace 
operational activities required to ensure freedom of action across all of the Navy’s 
warfighting domains in, through, from cyberspace, and to deny the same to the Navy’s 
adversaries” (FCC/C10F, n.d., para. 2). C10F is considered more operational vice 
administrative. They are charged with carrying out specific missions and exercises in 
support of FCC. According to C10F, their mission is to “to plan, monitor, direct, assess, 
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communicate, coordinate, and execute operations to enable command and control and set 
the conditions for subordinate success through a task force structure similar to other 
warfare commanders” (FCC/C10F, n.d., para. 3). They can conduct operational tasking 
through their Maritime Operations Center (MOC) located in Fort George Meade, 
Maryland (FCC/C10F, n.d., para. 2). 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
In 2018, then FCC/C10F Chief of Staff (COS),  Captain James Mills (now retired) 
directed the N9 to head up research on visualization of data, human computer interactions 
(HCI), and identify the most efficient way to display network health and status to a watch 
stander and decision-maker. Specific guidance included: 
1. Using the Integrated Navy Operations Support System (INOSS) 
architectural framework, evaluate existing software tools for deployment 
to Department of DODIN-N watch floors, NOCs, and for use by afloat IT 
personnel. As of April 2020, the term INOSS has been changed to 
Integrated Navy Operations Command and Control System (INOCS). Due 
to the advanced stage of writing of this thesis, the author chose to continue 
using INOSS.  
2. Consider industry and other government implementations, best practices, 
and employment of similar systems. 
3. Integrate existing and novel malicious activity notifications into the 
INOSS framework to allow appropriate personnel the freedom to 
quarantine and investigate the activity. 
4. Identify how these tools will support existing Navy programs of record. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Organizations within the FCC/C10F organization utilize an array of tools and 
processes to support and defend and protect Navy networks, however, they lack a 
common infrastructure and an interoperable tool or enterprise policy that permits 
technology to best support network operations (NETOPS). In today’s environment, 
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employing technology to solve operational issues is pivotal. Reliable, timely, and 
accurate information sharing is required for the most basic of operations. Interoperability 
or effective information sharing should not be impeded by EISs, policies, or SLAs. 
Information systems are continuously exploited and attacked. The ability to share 
information is important at all levels; however, this thesis will focus on processes within 
the  FCC/C10F organization. 
The U.S. Navy relies on the transport, exchange, and processing of data in both 
ashore and afloat environments. Commanders require the ability to monitor Navy 
networks for management, situational awareness, and initiatives. Field observations for 
this thesis revealed that in the current operating environment, commands are inundated 
with various systems that are not interoperable, do not work to their full potential, or do 
not work at all for the contested environment the Navy operates in today. According to a 
DOD instruction, the information environment is a “complex layering of multiple 
networks with overlapping, duplicative roles and responsibilities” (DOD, 2013b, p. 28) 
that do not fully support information sharing. The hindrance of information exchange due 
to technical limitations, mandates, policies, or SLAs can place the Navy at a massive 
disadvantage.  
In today’s world, organizations need, according to Panetto and Cecil (2013), 
“collaboration using information technology and other tools to succeed” (p. 1) in a 
competitive environment. Enterprise information sharing is essential for ashore and afloat 
commands. The process is often complicated by rapidly changing opportunities, 
technologies, policies, or legislation (Panetto & Cecil, 2013). Often, an organization may 
find themselves in an immediate need or opportunity to acquire new technology and they 
make decisions without long term thought to enterprise communication over time. 
Ideally, all data, services, processes, and entities within the organization should operate at 
an enterprise level. When there are subordinates within an organization operating at 
different policy and access control levels, that can negatively impact the overall ability of 
the organization to share information effectively.  
Changes in software, hardware, mandates, and policies can help an organization 
align processes conducive to information sharing and reduce barriers. This positive 
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change is due to software, hardware, mandates, and policies supporting each other for the 
free flow of information throughout the organization. It is integral to information sharing 
that mandates, policies, and orders are positively contributing to the organization’s ability 
to share information.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What information technologies in use are negatively affecting 
FCC/C10F’s ability to share and receive timely information across the 
organization? 
2. How might changes in information technologies positively affect 
FCC/C10F’s ability to share and receive timely information across the 
organization? 
3. What mandates or policies in use are affecting negatively FCC/C10F’s 
ability to share and receive timely information across the organization? 
4. How might changes in mandates or policies positively affect FCC/C10F’s 
ability to share and receive timely information across the organization? 
5. What contractual issues are negatively affecting FCC/C10F’s ability to 
share and receive timely information across the organization? 
6. How might contractual changes positively affect FCC/C10F’s ability to 
share and receive timely information across the organization? 
D. PRELIMINARY RESEARCH APPROACH 
The goal of this thesis is to assess whether the available tools, existing policies, or 
contractual agreements are undermining information sharing within the FCC/C10F 
organization, and to seek technical solutions, mandates or policy changes to support 
current and evolving requirements. This thesis will focus on technology, policy, and SLA 
concerns that prohibit or restrict information sharing and that increase latency and reduce 
accuracy for the decision-makers.  
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The scope of systems to be researched include any software, hardware, 
applications, or architectures in use that could be improved upon for better information 
sharing. This research is limited to the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and the 
information systems, mandates, policies, and SLAs within that network. Due to scope 
limitations, it does not include the afloat Information Technology for the 21st Century 
network (IT-21) or the Navy Enterprise Network (ONE-NET).  
In this research environment, mandates and policies are dispersed at different 
levels. Operational orders are directives that drive military operations at all levels. They 
serve as the principal means by which the commander expresses decisions, intent, and 
guidance. They are directives issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the 
purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. They can be utilized for 
short-term and long-term operations. Regulatory measures and policies include directives 
from the Department of Defense (DOD), Executive Branch, and legislation from 
Congress to protect information and systems. The policies will focus on Tier 1, Tier 2, 
and Tier 3 organizations in three key policy areas: Technical Policy, Organization Policy, 
and Regulatory/Executive Policies.  
Issues within SLAs can lead to poor information sharing within an organization. 
Per a Department of the Navy (DON) Chief Information Officer (CIO) Enterprise 
Commercial Information Technology (IT) Strategy Team member, SLAs “provide an 
agreed upon framework for the delivery of services and the measurement of service 
quality” (Panaro, 2010, para. 21). They detail the responsibilities of the vendor to the 
organization. Some of the field research conducted implied that information sharing was 
reduced because current SLAs in place were not granular enough to support such a 
requirement. For example, an information system used by Logistics may suit their needs 
but the same system does not provide enough detail for a Comptroller to project budgets. 
To share information effectively across multiple entities, all programs need to have the 
ability to share and receive information. This research will broadly examine SLAs and 
how they can impact information sharing. 
The research objectives include: 
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• Describing the current organizational relationships between the Tier 1, 2, 
and 3 organizations, 
• Describing current mandates and policies at the organizations, 
• Describing current technological tools in use,  
• Describing potential contractual issues,  
• Explaining how changes in technological tools, mandates, policies, and 
contracts can increase information sharing within the organization, and  
• Providing recommendations. 
The overall approach is based on a survey of relevant academic literature and 
field observations. This will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the research 
design.  
E. OVERVIEW 
As a portion of a larger research project funded by FCC, this information sharing 
research focuses on the impact on network operations at the unit and operational levels. 
Chapter II provides an overview of the entire project encompassing autonomous actions, 
network traffic anomaly detection, and visualization on Navy networks. The overall goal 
is to establish positive and negative effects to facilitate access to real-time information on 
Navy networks. 
To fully grasp the concepts of information sharing, it is important to understand 
what is gained from effective information sharing and what is lost by inefficient 
information sharing. Chapter III provides literature that supports this research while also 
examining pitfalls that contribute to decreased information sharing. 
To identify positive and negative impact areas, it was imperative to research 
efforts and processes that were successfully and unsuccessfully implemented. Field 
research and interviews were conducted with various military and civilian industry 
leaders. Chapter IV details the results of those visits. 
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Information learned through field research and interviews are further analyzed in 
Chapter V. This chapter will detail specific technologies, policies, mandates, and SLAs 
and their individual limiting factors, solutions, and best practices. 
Chapter VI will summarize the main points of this research and provide 
recommendations for concrete actions to enhance information sharing within a DOD 
organization.     
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II. FLEET CYBER COMMAND PROJECT 
A. NAVY’S CYBER VISION 
Our Navy will protect America from attack, promote American prosperity, 
and preserve America’s strategic influence. U.S. naval operations—from 
the seafloor to space, from the blue water to the littorals, and in the 
information domain—will deter aggression and enable resolution of crises 
on terms acceptable to the United States and our allies and partners. (Chief 
of Naval Operations, 2018, p. 1) 
This is part of the mission statement that was promulgated by Admiral John M. 
Richardson, in A Design For Maintaining Maritime Superiority. From this statement, one 
can gather that now, more than ever, the information domain plays a vital role in 
protecting our country. Within the information domain falls the cyber domain and 
FCC/C10F, which have been charged with defending and delivering effects in and 
through cyberspace. From FCC’s command page, part of their mission is to “conduct 
operations in and through cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and space to ensure 
Navy and Joint/Coalition freedom of action and decision superiority while denying the 
same to our adversaries” (FCC/C10F, n.d., para. 1). FCC and C10F are co-located in Fort 
Meade, MD, and also have a dual-hatted commander. 
B. FCC/C10F TASKING 
In 2018, then-FCC/C10F Chief of Staff (COS) Captain James Mills directed the 
N9 to head up research on visualization of data, human computer interactions (HCI), and 
identify the most efficient way to display network health and status to a watch stander 
and decision-maker. Specific guidance included: 
Using the Integrated Navy Operations Support System (INOSS) architectural 
framework, evaluate existing software tools for deployment to the Department of 
DODIN-N watch floors, NOCs, and for use by afloat IT personnel. 
1. Consider industry and other government implementations, best practices, 
and employment of similar systems. 
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2. Integrate existing and novel malicious activity notifications into the 
INOSS framework to allow appropriate personnel the freedom to 
quarantine and investigate the activity. 
3. Identify how these tools will support existing Navy programs of record. 
This led to the funding for NPS research to be conducted by thesis students. Dr. 
Dan Boger was appointed as the Principal Investigator and then selected students with 
skill sets that aligned with the requirements of the aforementioned research. The theses 
and their respective deliverables are as follows: 
C. ARCHITECTING AUTONOMOUS ACTIONS IN NAVY ENTERPRISE 
NETWORKS (NENS) 
Dr. Dan Boger and Dr. Luqi are co-thesis advisors for LT Max Geiszler. This 
thesis investigates Navy Enterprise Networks (NENs) in an attempt to better understand 
the fundamental operation of the Navy’s networks. The main idea behind that research is 
to explain how NENs can conduct NetOps to meet unique Navy mission sets and ensure 
adequate information is given to higher up organizations. The investigation covers some 
of the use-cases in which the Navy has an intensive need for human-driven processes to 
accomplish necessary critical tasks. It also explores where man-hours are being 
inefficiently spent due to process redundancy and limited human watch-stander 
proficiency. It then suggests a technical architectural change to NEN infrastructure 
utilizing the INOSS framework, which helps to facilitate automated solutions to problems 
that have been presented by FCC/C10F. It also suggests a change to tightly integrate 
DevOps in operational processes. 
D. NETWORK TRAFFIC ANOMALY DETECTION ON A NAVY 
NETWORK  
Dr. John Monaco is the thesis advisor for LT Michael Laws and LT Greg Bunder. 
This thesis determines the viability of using existing unsupervised machine learning 
techniques to detect anomalous network traffic from an unclassified Navy network with a 
level of accuracy equal to current anomaly detection systems. Upon completion, this 
thesis gives a recommendation as to whether unsupervised machine learning can be used 
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for anomaly detection. If the hypothesis is accurate, that this is possible and is a more 
efficient method than what is currently used, then a detailed analysis of which features 
are most important for anomaly detection along with any lessons learned and obstacles 
met during research are provided. Lastly, this thesis addresses what an architecture might 
look like that would be used to implement network anomaly detection via unsupervised 
machine learning within the INOSS framework. 
E. THE FUNCTIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO NETWORK 
OPERATIONS 
Dr. Dan Boger is the thesis advisor for Commander Henry Lee Bush. The thesis 
analyzes the current visualization efforts at various organizations, the private sector, and 
the public sector, to better understand how visualization provides a network’s health and 
status. The main idea behind the thesis is to evaluate visualization in key focus areas: a 
single pane of glass, information immersion, information framework, and information 
concept. It does this by covering case studies that were done through the site observation 
to identify how information is collected, processed, analyzed, and visualized to support 
command and control of the network. Through the case studies, the thesis also reviews 
the information not captured because of stovepiped systems, limited shared management 
information, and those manual processes which reduce the information in visualization. 
The information not captured in turn impacts situational awareness and decision-making 
which negatively impacts command and control of the network. The thesis recommends 
the use of the INOSS functional framework to improve processes to support visualization 
of information and information immersion through space design. Lastly, it introduces an 
information management concept to support the command and control of the network. 
F. HOW INFORMATION SHARING AFFECTS NETWORK OPERATIONS 
Dr. Dan Boger is the thesis advisor for this author. Effective information sharing 
between various components are crucial to FCC/C10F successfully and efficiently 
meeting the mission. The thesis has two goals. The primary goal is to examine whether 
existing information systems, mandates, policies, or Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
are limiting information sharing within the FCC/C10F organization. The secondary goal 
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is to seek technical and non-technical solutions to support current and evolving 
requirements. The thesis will evaluate solutions studied that can positively impact 
information sharing for the organization. Research approaches include interviews and 
observations in academia, civilian IT sector, defense organizations, programs of record, 
and Tier 1, 2, and 3 providers. From the research gathered, conclusions are drawn to the 
effectiveness of current technologies, mandates, and policies, and proposed solutions are 
offered.  
13 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature and policies distinctly discuss the importance of information sharing 
but there appears to be a gap between theory and implementation in the fleet. 
Government and DOD documents connect information sharing to capabilities needed to 
meet the mission and acknowledge the importance of alignment between technology and 
policies which are also supported in preliminary research into barriers of effective 
information sharing. The 2018 National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) specifically 
identifies and establishes the importance of information sharing. The Secretary of the 
Navy’s (SENAV) 2019 Cyber Readiness Review expressed concern for the DON to “take 
immediate steps to lower the barriers to communication to enhance information sharing 
and collaboration” (SECNAV, 2019, p. 16). Ample scholarly literature has reinforced the 
necessity for effective information sharing, thus making this research pivotal. This 
chapter will examine national strategy, DOD documents, and various literature through 
primary and secondary research methods to research information systems, policies, and 
SLAs that are limiting information sharing, and provide recommendations that will have 
a positive effect on information sharing.  
A. NATIONAL STRATEGY 
The NCSS emphasizes the importance of better information sharing to improve 
awareness and reduce duplicative activities (White House, 2018). Both the military and 
the nation are growing increasingly reliant upon critical infrastructures and cyber-based 
information systems. The NCSS identifies that reliable information analysis that is 
quickly available has continued to be an enduring challenge. According to the President, 
“New threats and a new era of strategic competition demands strategy that responds to 
new realities and deters adversaries “ (White House, 2018, p. 2). To accomplish the 
national strategy, effective information sharing is essential. According to the NCSS, a 
purely technocratic approach is insufficient to address the ever-changing problems the 
Navy continues to face; effective policies are also required. Every goal and intention 
within the NCSS requires effective information sharing. Most external research is 
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conducted in support of cyber threat information; however, this research will examine 
different approaches to positively impact information sharing to include technologies, 
policies, and SLAs at an operational level within the FCC/C10 organization.  
B. DOD DOCUMENTS 
Information sharing is a critical enabler of situational awareness of the DODIN-N 
and DOD missions. According to DOD Instruction 8320.02, “data, information, and IT 
services are considered enablers of information sharing to the DOD” (Department of 
Defense [DOD], 2013a, p. 2). The instruction specifies that “data, information, and IT 
services will be made visible, accessible, understandable, trusted, and interoperable 
throughout their life cycles for all authorized users” (DOD, 2013a, p. 14). The instruction 
establishes the role of the DOD CIO is to: 
Guide and oversee matters related to the sharing of data, information, and 
IT services to ensure interoperability down to the technical level internally 
with DOD and externally with mission partners, including: establishing, 
maintaining, and enforcing governance of the DOD’s IT policies and 
processes to enable secure sharing of DOD data, information, and IT 
services, including information assurance, discovery, accessibility, and 
dissemination requirements. (DOD, 2013a, p. 6) 
DISA is a supporting agency of the DOD. Its main goal is to support and defend 
the DODIN. Under the DOD CIO, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is 
responsible for:  
Enterprise technical feasibility assessments with recommendations for 
sharing all DOD data, information, and IT services as directed and make 
available enterprise services and the interface standards and specifications 
for the sharing of data, information, and IT services in order to meet the 
needs of the DOD. (DOD, 2013a, p. 6) 
Lastly, according to a DOD instruction, the “Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) shall update defense Acquisition 
System policies and procedures and provide guidance to program managers and Program 
Executive Officer to evaluate and approve system or program implementation of data 
sharing practices” (DOD, 2013a, p.7). 
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C. LITERATURE 
The literature suggests that information technology, policies, and SLAs must be 
aligned to be effective. The U.S. Navy understands this concept and has been actively 
pursuing all avenues that provide better situational awareness for commanders. At the 
core of all military operations across forces, situational awareness is paramount. In 2015, 
Rear Adm. David Lewis, the commander of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR) (now known as the Naval Information Warfare Systems 
Command (NAVWAR)), stated, “Emerging technology and improved cyber performance 
are inexorably linked” (SPAWAR, 2015, para 3). Research has been conducted into 
individual systems and the level of details they provide to the common operating picture 
(COP), consolidation of command and control (C2) systems, and defining a common 
architecture across all surface combatants and maritime domain awareness. As Leedom 
(2019) pointed out, a COP is a repository of information for decision-makers. That 
repository depends on real-time information sharing. Furthermore, Leedom asserts the 
repository should present organized information that is easily identifiable and relevant to 
the decision-maker. 
Barriers that affect effective information sharing include conceptual, 
technological, and organizational barriers (Chen, 2006). Chen (2006) goes on to suggest 
that,  conceptual barriers pertains to syntactic and semantic compatibility, technological 
barriers pertains to platform and software technology and organizational barriers to 
overall responsibilities and structure. These barriers include who is responsible for what, 
who is authorized to do what, and overall structure of the organization. When attempting 
to exchange data in an environment where all the data is coming from differing sources, 
each receiving systems needs to be able to process the data. Syntactic differences focus 
on syntax and format whereas semantic differences focus on systems end to end being 
able to exchange and utilize the information being passed.  
The Naval War College (NWC) has studied how well the Navy and industry are 
prepared for network-centric warfare. Dombrowski and Ross pointed out that “the Navy’s 
abilities to collect and share information, sustain operations, operate in a more stealthy 
fashion, and directly contribute to the defense of the American homeland will improve” 
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(Dombrowski and Ross, 2003, p. 20). Information sharing is pivotal to a network-centric 
environment. Network-centric warfare consists of a battle group or joint task force that 
can share real-time knowledge through common communications systems. The research 
conducted focused on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) requirements, but success would have been 
impossible without effective information sharing. According to the Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Information Dominance, “Capabilities required across the DOD to 
enable information sharing, collaboration, and interoperability will be provisioned as 
enterprise services” (Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information 
Dominance, 2012, para 4). Although just a theory years ago, the need for information 
sharing in support of real-time operations and network status is vital for a military 




IV. RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis is a small part of a larger research project. The research was conducted 
as a team with individual emphasis on each of our individual thesis topic areas. 
Fieldwork was conducted to gather information through live observations and interviews 
with subject matter experts. This approach allowed an opportunity for one-on-one 
demonstrations that facilitated thorough research. On-site visits were conducted at 
military and civilian organizations. The objective was to understand the 
watch/organization environment, view firsthand current technologies, processes, 
procedures, and best practices utilized regarding real-time information sharing in support 
of the status of networks. Follow up research was conducted with some organizations to 
ascertain whether or not any updates or changes had been completed since the site visit. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the setup of each organization visited to 
include its mission, watch setup, and tool usage if any. Further analysis to identify 
problems and possible solutions will be discussed in Chapter V. Some of this information 
will be covered broadly as there are hundreds of thousands of policies that may impact a 
command, and it was beyond the scope of this research to address all of them. Therefore, 
this thesis broaches key policies as a starting point to improve network-centric warfare 
practices for situational awareness and information sharing. 
A. MILITARY  
This section will detail multiple organizations’ missions and watch team set up to 
show the scope of responsibility of the organization and the importance of real-time 
information sharing. This section will also discuss tool usage at each organization. Due to 
individual missions, some organizations may utilize more tools than others. The research 
team visited several military sites. A majority of the sites had relatively large and 
disjointed networks that isolated themselves from other applications and systems. Many 
of the sites displayed issues due to multiple programs of record (PORs), decentralized 
management, lack of common tools, varying installation methods, and lack of NetOps 
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framework, all of which greatly affect an organization’s ability to efficiently share 
information.  
On-site visits were conducted with larger military commands within the 
FCC/C10F organization such as Navy Network Warfare Command (NNWC), Navy 
Computer Telecommunication Master Area Station Pacific (NCTAMS PAC), Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA), Information Assurance and Cyber Security 
Program Office (PMW 130) and Shore and Expeditionary Integration (PMW 790), all 
identified in Table 1. Not all commands under the FCC/C10F were able to be visited or 
contacted for this research. 
Table 1. Research Team’s Visits (Military) 
Short Name  Name  Location 
FCC/C10F Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet (Telephone) VA 
NNWC  Navy Network Warfare Command  Norfolk 
NCTAMS  
PAC  
Navy Computer Telecommunication Master Area 
Station Pacific 
Hawaii 
DISA  Defense Information Systems Agency  Hawaii 
PMW 130 Information Assurance and Cyber Security Program 
Office 
San Diego 
PMW 790 Shore and Expeditionary Integration Charleston 
 
a. FLTCYBERCOM/C10F  
Per the FCC/C10F Strategic plan, globally, FCC/C10F is responsible for 
“directing the operations and defense of the Navy’s networks and operating shore-to-ship 
communications systems, including Nuclear Command and Control Communications 
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(NC3)” (FCC/C10F, 2015, p. 10). As an Echelon II command, they report directly to the 
CNO. FCC/C10F does not rely on any tools that are generic to the watch floor. They rely 
entirely on reporting from subordinate commands via human interaction or message 
traffic.  
To better support their mission, information sharing in support of real-time 
network status is crucial. At the heart of the command is the Battle Watch Captain 
(BWC), who maintains real-time situational awareness and is the principal advisor to the 
commander. They are able to meet their responsibilities with the support of an Assistant 
Battle Watch Captain (ABWC) and a watch team that includes a watch section for 
Network Operations (NETOPS), Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Intel, NMCI, and Video 
Teleconference (VTC), among others not expanded upon in this research.  
The DODIN OPS Watchstander monitors all message traffic and notifies the 
BWC of any pertinent information or network outages. Additionally, they coordinate 
with NNWC if necessary, to determine the resolution of network outages that meet FCC 
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) criteria and monitor the health 
and status of the NC3 infrastructure. The DODIN OPS watch is typically filled by junior 
enlisted personnel. The SIGINT WO works with the regional task forces and ships 
monitoring point guard and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) connectivity 
from the ship to the shore. They also monitor any cryptologic collections and 
connectivity of systems on afloat units to provide real-time situational awareness for 
afloat units. This is typically filled by Petty Officer Second or Petty Officer First class. 
The watch also maintains dedicated 24/7 VTC and NMCI representative support. All 
watch stations collectively, with other support staff support, the commander’s decision 
cycle through real-time information and network statuses. The commander’s decision 




Figure 1. Commander’s Decision Cycle. Source: FCC/C10F 
MOC (2015). 
FCC/C10F is responsible for reporting the statuses of many commands. If any of the 
organizations beneath them were to lose connectivity, they would not know the network 
status in real-time. According to NNWC: 
In 2002, some 23 organizations from several commands, including the 
former Naval Space Command, Naval Computer and Telecommunications 
Command, Fleet Information Warfare Center, and Navy Component Task 
Force - Computer Network Defense were brought together to form Naval 
Network Warfare Command, emphasizing the organization’s focus on the 
operation and defense of the Navy’s networks. (NETWARCOM, n.d.-b, 
para. 1.) 
As a tactical arm of FCC/C10F, NNWC reports to FCC/C10F. The current 
process of notification is for components subordinate to NNWC to report them via phone, 
email, or update brief and then that information is passed up the chain of command to 
FCC/C10F. As a Fleet Commander, FCC may not have an interest in knowing the real-
time status of certain components that are not considered critical. Despite the priority of 
various components, this thesis attempts to explore a way for NNWC to receive and 
provide reports closer to real-time.  
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b. Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) 
NNWC’s mission, according to its public homepage, is to “execute tactical-level 
command and control to DOD Information Networks; leverage Joint Space capabilities 
for Navy and Joint Operations” (NETWARCOM, n.d.-a, para. 1). NNWC reports their 
status and those of their subordinates directly to FCC/C10F. Subordinate commands are 
identified in Figure 2. NNWC is able to accomplish its mission with over 13,000 
personnel and is responsible for multiple commands and detachments. They implement 
critical requirements for subordinate commands for decision-making and situational 
awareness. NNWC is focused on operating, securing, and managing the network and 
utilizes a variety of tools.  
NNWC has several sites that report to them and they report to FCC/C10F, which 
in turn reports to Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) DODIN. The Navy has many different 
command relationships, and information sharing in support of the mission is vital in 
every single entity. As a part of a larger relationship, NNWC’s subordinate commands 
that require continuous monitoring and reporting include the Global Network Operations 
and Security Center (GNOSC), NMCI, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 
Master Station Pacific (NCTAMS PAC), Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 
Master Station Atlantic (NCTAMS LANT), Naval Computer and Telecommunications 
Station (NCTS) Bahrain, NCTS Naples, NCTS Far East and Naval Satellite Operations 
Center (NAVSOC). The BWC plays a vital role in monitoring and reporting to higher 
headquarters. The NNWC structure can be seen in Figure 2 This organizational chart is 
an overview of the subordinate commands that fall under NNWC purview. This thesis 
will focus on NNWC’s ability to share and receive real-time information throughout the 
larger organization.  
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Figure 2. NNWC Organization Chart. Adapted from 
NETWARCOM (n.d.). 
The watch stations observed at NNWC in support of the BWC included the IT 
Service Operations (ITSO), Network Tactical Operations Center (NTOC), Joint Regional 
Security Stack (JRSS), and the Host Based Security System (HBSS). Per the NNWC 
BWC, NNWC currently does not have a real-time COP where they can see the entire 
network and receive updates real-time. NNWC currently relies on daily updates via VTC, 
briefs, chat, and telephone. Shared cyber awareness via information sharing is integral for 
the critical information that NNWC is responsible for. Extended outages, not knowing 
exactly where the outages are, or reporting inaccurate information are all errors that could 
be rectified significantly with improved information sharing across the enterprise.  
In the absence of a central automated COP, NNWC relies on data aggregation or 
analysis from various tools that are available to everyone to include:  Splunk, Forescout, 
NETSCOUT, Mission Assurance Decision Support System (MADSS), Enterprise 
Network Management System (ENMS) and Tanium.  
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• SPLUNK is a tool that allows the ability to search, analyze, and visualize 
large amounts of data. This is a popular tool in the fleet to assist in helping 
organizations meet compliance requirements, implement continuous 
monitoring, detect patterns, and provide overall real-time situational 
awareness in operations. Splunk is dependent upon data inputs from 
various POR systems.  
• Forescout allows the ability to automate security and compliance with its 
agentless software. The software conducts discovery and classification of 
all devices on the network to better facilitate system administration. In the 
cyber world, to defend a network, it is vital to know what assets are 
connected to it. Forescout solutions can help in that realm but do not 
provide a “one-stop” solution that is geared toward real-time information 
sharing.  
• NETSCOUT is a live monitoring tool that can monitor and analyze 
network and application traffic flows through all of the NMCI nodes. 
NETSCOUT offers several different products; however, NETSCOUT is 
not one of the organizations the research team visited or researched further 
in this thesis. Additional research should be conducted to see how 
NETSCOUT can fit into the picture of delivering real-time information 
flow throughout the FCC/C10F organization.  
• MADSS allows the BWC team the ability to see the status of all DISA 
circuits, maintenance, or authorized service interruptions (ASIs). 
According to DISA, “Whether it’s part of the deliberate planning process 
or analyzing courses of action for a contingency, such as a natural disaster, 
the Mission Assurance Branch ensures the Defense Information Systems 
Network (DISN) experiences minimal disruption” (DISA, 2018, para. 3). 
The criticality of real-time information sharing is further stressed 
according to DISA, “because the DOD relies so heavily on the DISN, any 
interruption to the critical infrastructure could severely affect DOD’s 
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ability to execute its mission, thus negatively impacting the warfighter” 
(DISA, 2018, para. 6). 
• ENMS is said to be providing a “COP-like” picture for the Fleet NOCs. A 
lot of commands use it largely for their ticketing system. A Principal 
Assistant Program Manager (PAPM) at PMW 790 described ENMS as a 
capability under the Shore Tactical Assured Command and Control 
(STACC) POR that supports Network Operations (NetOps). One of the 
NetOps capabilities is to provide a NetOps COP, and this is accomplished 
with the use of several tools. The overarching tool for presentation is Edge 
Appboard. This tool interfaces with Edge Technologies enPortal web 
server that collects data from various servers such as BMC IT Service 
Management (ITSM), BMC Atrium Orchestrator (BAO), BMC Blade 
Logic Server Automation (BSA), BMC Blade Logic Network Automation 
(BBNA),  BMC Blade Logic Performance Management (BPPM), and 
others. One of the most used tools is the AfloatSA, which is government 
off-the-shelf (GOTS) developed code to infer as much as possible about 
afloat systems based on what watch standers can see from the shore. This 
provides an overarching view of all the afloat units in the area of 
responsibility (AOR). This research focuses on the capability of shore 
units. There is a similar tool for Ashore NOC components under Ashore 
SA. 
• Tanium is another tool in use by NNWC. It allows for visibility and 
control of endpoints on a network, but it is not a full solution that would 
support information sharing on an enterprise level. In layman’s terms, it 
allows you to ask a question against the network, e.g., does any user on X 
network have Y file, and you will get an answer very quickly from over 
290,000 devices. Tanium is deployed on NIPRNet. Tanium is very 
powerful but it has its disadvantages, which will be explored in Chapter V. 
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The Tanium organization is not one of the organizations the research team 
visited or researched further in this thesis.  
The tools discussed previously individually do not help with ensuring the 
FCC/C10F organization can share information efficiently in support of real-time network 
statuses. They are discussed to give an idea of the current capabilities of NNWC and an 
overview of some of the tools in use. Further analysis and recommendations will be in 
Chapter V.  
c. Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station Pacific 
(NCTAMS PAC) 
With a force of over 700 personnel, NCTAMS PAC has a three-part mission. Part 
I of the mission is to provide operational C4I capabilities to assets in the Pacific and 
Indian Ocean areas of operation. Part II of the mission is to operate, maintain, secure, and 
defend the Navy’s portion of the DODIN in its AOR. Finally, part III of the mission is to 
direct the day to day operations of two subordinate commands, two detachments, and 
eight activities across 12 time zones (NCTAMS PAC, n.d., p. 1). NCTAMS PAC AOR 
can be seen in Figure 3 NCTAMS PAC reports directly to NNWC.  
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Figure 3. NCTAMS PAC AOR. Source: NCTAMS PAC 
(2017). 
At the time of the site visit, the watch team was split into multiple watch sections 
with approximately 30 personnel on watch during the day watch rotation. The different 
sections included the Pacific Message Center, Pacific Region Network Operations Center 
(PRNOC), Tech Control, Joint Fleet Telecommunications Operations Center (JFTOC), 
Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN), and the Pacific Region Security 
Operations Center (PRSOC). For the purpose of this research, we will focus on the 
JFTOC. The JFTOC Watch Officer (WO) is the principal advisor for all things 
transpiring on the watch floor, and they must be operationally aware of current Navy 
missions at all times. There is a tangible need for information sharing and real-time 
network statuses for decision-making and reporting. The JFTOC WO had various 
applications available that they could use to pull information from, but none of these 
applications worked in a COP-like manner that was synchronized and populated with 
real-time information. The closest view the JFTOC WO was able to utilize was the Navy 
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Cyber Situational Awareness (NCSA) application and even that was not fully populated 
at the time of our visit. NCSA is only as good as the inputs it receives. They also utilized 
ENMS but the tickets were input manually and hindered real-time capability. At that 
time, NCTAMS PAC was also working on a proposal to create a small demonstration 
network for out-of-band management.  
On a second visit, NCTAMS PAC had stood up a Security Operations Center 
(SOC) on the watch floor for Cyber Defense Operations (CDO). According to the Naval 
Enterprise Networks, a SOC is a “centralized unit in an organization that deals with 
organization and technical security issues” (NEN, 2013, p. 114). The SOC focuses on 
enhancing their personal use of ENMS capabilities such as Afloat SA, Live Action, and 
Email Queue functions to provide security situational awareness of the many networks 
and organizations under their purview. From the first visit, they had made substantial 
progress concerning system discovery, link status information, mail server information, 
configuration management, and live-action information through ENMS. Information 
sharing and real-time network status were a large part of their effort to support their DCO 
and subordinates. A major problem identified at the time, expounded upon in Chapter V, 
was the lack of simple network management protocol (SNMP) data from all PORs to 
support a fully integrated COP.  
d. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Pacific (PAC) 
The Plans and Programs Technical Director of DISA PAC provided a DISA 
mission brief and NOC tour. DISA has many customers, including Indo-Pacific 
Command (PACOM) for whom it provides sensor taps to monitor transport services for 
malicious activity. Many service components rely on DISA transport services.  
DISA PAC has partnerships with internet service providers (ISPs) to provide 
internet access and circuits to the customer. DISA PAC’s mission is, according to their 
public home page is to “provide, operate, and assure command and control, information 
sharing capabilities, and a globally accessible enterprise information infrastructure in 
direct support to the joint Warfighters, National level leaders, and other mission and 
coalition partners across the full spectrum of operations” (DISA, n.d., p.2). The DISA 
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NOC operational commander is U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) via DISA. 
Because DISA NOC is in the PACOM AOR, it receives various tasking from PACOM 
which has to be cleared with DISA. This type of relationship creates authority ambiguity 
among the echelons. In peacetime, PACOM does not have full authority over DISA or 
some service components. Of course, in wartime PACOM has complete authority. To 
date, tasking from PACOM, regardless of the threat environment, does not have to be 
acted upon by DISA NOC until approved by DISA. Despite chain of command (COC) 
issues, DISA monitors their circuits in real-time and is aware when circuits are down. 
They have a watch section that is responsible for following up on any outages and 
gaining an understanding of the full scope of impact. As with most providers, DISA also 
receives contacts and updates from customers when there are outages.  
e. Information Assurance and Cyber Security Program Office (PMW 130 )  
PMW 130 “plans, manages and executes program resources to ensure continued 
protection of Navy and joint information, telecommunications and information systems 
from hostile exploitation and attack” (Vitha, 2018, para 14). PMW 130 is an echelon III 
command that reports to PEO C4I. PEO C4I reports to NAVWAR. 
The site visit to PWM-130 revealed information on the current state of Navy 
applications and the development of Navy future networks. PMW 130’s NCSA and 
SHARKCAGE are applications that are receiving new and innovative data captures from 
many different points of Navy Networks. PMW 130 facilitated access to the NCSA Lab, 
located in San Diego, for a hands-on demonstration and detailed discussions of NCSA 
and SHARKCAGE. The visit allowed us the ability to become more familiar with 
programs the Navy is currently utilizing for current and future requirements. NCSA is 
used by most of the commands we visited. It is used to provide near real-time situational 
awareness of operations via information sharing between systems and links. The 
application can analyze multiple different streams of data to present a fully 
interconnected view for a watch stander or decision-maker. According to the 2018 
SPAWAR List, “SHARKCAGE utilizes one-way passive taps in a protected, out-of-
band, classified environment, SHARKCAGE consolidates cyber event data from multiple 
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platforms and networks, providing Navy DCO forces with a shared environment and 
common platform for integrated workflow, collaboration, and analysis” (SPAWAR, 
2018, p. 8). It is the goal of PMW 130 to provide a centralized, thorough, and real-time 
view of their organization. Many of the commands we visited utilized these applications; 
further analysis will be conducted in Chapter V and recommendations will be provided in 
Chapter VI. 
B. CIVILIAN INDUSTRY  
On-site visits and telephone conversations were conducted with larger civilian 
organizations within the information technology field such as the NMCI NOC, AT&T, 
and Amazon, as identified in Table 2. Information provided in this section will detail only 
information uncovered during the onsite visits or phone conversations.  
Table 2. Research Team’s Visits (Civilian) 
Short Name  Name  Location 
NMCI NOC  NMCI Network Operations Center HI/VA 
AT&T  AT&T NJ 
Amazon Amazon (Telephone) San Diego 
 
a. Amazon  
Amazon is a leading cloud provider. Per a Senior Navy Account Representative, 
they can provide capabilities across all military classification levels. For this research, we 
specifically wanted to look at how Amazon was able to accomplish in-house real-time 
information sharing to support a real-time network status picture. We were unable to get 
any proprietary details into Amazon’s internal procedures/processes and our research 
concluded without further research into individual services provided by Amazon. 
Additional research can be conducted into the various solutions that Amazon may be able 
to provide to the FCC/10F organization. 
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b. NMCI Network Operations Center (NOC) 
NMCI is responsible for an immense amount of information services in use by the 
FCC/C10F organization. “NMCI provides end-to-end secure Information Technology 
(IT) services to more than 400,000 seats and 900,000 users, across 2,500+ locations that 
vary from major bases to single user locations” (Naval Enterprise Networks [NEN], 
2013, p. 14). To provide services, NMCI has several NOCs around the world that 
provides network operations, defense monitoring, and situational awareness. The NOCs 
are responsible for day-to-day operations, maintenance, remote management, change 
control, and to respond to network service anomalies in their given AOR (NEN, 2013). 
The NMCI NOC is located on Ford Island in Oahu, Hawaii and, is responsible for 
24/7 monitoring of network traffic throughout the United States. Overall, it was manned 
less than NCTAMS PAC and the roles were different in comparison. They have a C2 
watch that is 24/7, a customer relationship management area, and a performance 
management area. On-site processes were ill-defined and/or non-existent which 
complicated every issue that came in. They did not have a defined rule set to base their 
response actions on. We were unable to gain much insight into the network infrastructure 
and how data was passed. Details of watch responsibilities were not available and did not 
visually appear to be structured. The NOC supports NNWC and NCDOC in network 
operations and defensive cyberspace operations (DCO). In support of their 
responsibilities, they utilized the following tools:  
• HPE Network Node Manager (NMNi) is a proprietary network status 
COP. It provides outer/inner router information, Intrusion Prevention 
System (IPS) information, and some network node monitoring. All the 
information gathered is put in a COP-like display where it can be sorted 
and filtered.  
• iSPY is a proprietary plugin for NMNi. This tool gives 90-day reports, 
pulls information from a network by probing with ICMP dropped packets 
and analyzing round-trip reports. 
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• HP Service Manager (HPSM) is a proprietary Perspecta ticketing tool 
which may have some automation built in for alarming on built-in cases. It 
is updated manually based on information seen in NMNI. 
• Enterprise Content Management and Delivery (ECMD) is a proprietary 
ticket escalation tool that follows static rules, which when alerted, are 
prioritized by Perspecta to be followed up on. The information for this tool 
is always 24 hours behind. NNWC BWC has access to view this 
information via a web interface. This tool can be used for trend analysis. 
• Enterprise Navy Management System (ENMS) is a Navy system which 
Perspecta updates via a web-interface manually when CCIRs get tripped 
or Service Level Requirements (SLRs) are not met. 
c. AT&T 
AT&T facilitated a team visit to their Global Network Operations Center (GNOC) 
located in Bedminister Township, NJ to learn how AT&T’s underlying network 
administration technology functioned to include watch stander employment, processes, 
and automation which are discussed heavily in the other shared theses. 
AT&T’s GNOC is a sophisticated command and control center that monitors and 
manages hundreds of petabytes of global data 24/7 (AT&T, n.d., para. 2). The GNOC is 
very visual in its display of real-time information. With the many screens displaying 
information, watch standers can visually see information sharing and make a quick 
assessment in real-time. As a service provider, they are set up in a proactive posture vice 
reactive. 
AT&T divides its network management into a three-tier system to include Tier I, 
Tier II, and Tier III. Tier I is the GNOC which is their overarching command and control 
center to include incident and outage management. They receive inputs from the network 
that are processed through various algorithms and then presented to the watch stander. 
Tier II is the advanced technical support located in Georgia. Tier III is the regional 
component consisting of its network and service application reliability centers. They 
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receive work requests from the other two tiers and may have multiple Tier II assets under 
their scope of responsibility. Inputs into the tier system include alarms from physical 
systems such as IT operations, network service operations, mobility (Radio Access 
Network), IP backbone, transport, and voice switching. 
AT&T utilizes several proprietary software that can retrieve network status 
information by the GNOC on a timed synchronization. If for some reason the 
synchronization fails, the system is automatically considered offline and will send out an 
alert while taking the entire system offline. Equipment failures and other “alarm” type 
information is analyzed and put through a system that will have an algorithm for 
developing “alerts.” When a pattern of alarm types triggers an alert type, this is called a 
“threshold,” and AT&T has identified approximately 150 different threshold criteria 
which are very similar in intent to C10F/NNWC CCIR criteria. 
The ability to visit several different military and civilian organizations provided 
important insights into the research. It allowed the research team to look at various setups 
and try to objectively figure out hindrances to information sharing and possible solutions 
that could positively impact current situations. At the end of the visits, it was evident that 
the ability to share information effectively in a real-time manner was not possible across 





This chapter will detail the analysis of some of the tools and issues that were 
encountered during the research phase. It will talk about issues within the following three 
realms: technology, policies, and contracts. This chapter will mainly address issues that 
impact information sharing in various organizations. Examples will be provided from 
relevant field observations and are selective, not comprehensive. 
A. TECHNOLOGY  
In an information technology environment, technologies and their usage can help 
an organization run more effectively and efficiently. This research included looking at 
various applications and/or services utilized at various commands within the FCC/C10F 
organization and how they utilized them. It should be noted that each command used 
tools differently based on their operational level and mission. At this point in time, no 
one tool is used across the FCC/C10F organization that can provide real-time information 
exchange in support of real-time network statuses. This section will discuss some of the 
key concerns with technology that may limit information sharing including POR 
reluctance to share data, scalability issues, manning issues, security concerns, slow access 
to partially useful tools, or being overwhelmed with tools. 
1. POR reluctance to share data 
The lack of ability for devices to push data to management systems greatly 
inhibits an organization’s capability to effectively share real-time information. During the 
visit to NCTAMS PAC, NCSA was popular and appeared to be a rather good tool if it 
was able to be populated effectively. An issue identified included some POR systems not 
sharing SNMP V3 which would allow assets the ability to share information with ENMS 
and allow ample data for further analysis. Without SNMP V3, the only information 
ENMS can receive is “On” or “Off” (Up or Down). The PORs specific reasons for 
reluctance to share SNMP data is unvalidated but assumed to be contractual, proprietary, 
or ownership issues. SNMP data allows communication between devices that can be 
pulled into another application for analysis. The sharing of SNMP data would increase an 
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organization’s ability for information sharing. If NCTAMS PAC or any organization 
under the FCC/C10F organization were to receive SNMP V3 data from any systems they 
deemed necessary, they would have the ability to receive and analyze much more data in 
support of information sharing. Organizations would be able to create a relatively 
complete, near real-time status picture. SNMP has long been considered an insecure 
protocol because it is not encrypted. As defined by Coulombre (2013), 
SNMP is based on a model consisting of a manager, an agent, a database 
of management information, managed objects and the network protocol. 
The manager provides the interface between the human network manager 
and the management system. The agent provides the interface between the 
manager and the physical device(s) being managed. The information to be 
accessed is stored in a specified format in the device database, known as a 
Management Information Base (MIB), used by both the manager and the 
agent. MIBs contain the parameters to be collected for reporting, captured 
for notifications or configured by the corresponding management 
software. (p. 1) 
There are many different reasons why an organization would decide to not enable 
SNMP data on a network. Common concerns include security and bandwidth 
management. Security is a valid concern; however, that has been addressed in future 
versions of SNMP. A hash is a value that is produced after running data through a 
specific algorithm. It allows the ability to see whether or not data has been manipulated. 
Encryption is a method where the data is essentially encoded. Both hashing and 
encryption increased security. “Version 3 provides for far better security and privacy 
through authentication (using MD5 or SHA hash) and DES or AES encryption” 
(Coulombre, 2013, p. 1). As future versions are created, it is reasonable to assume that 
the security measures will only increase. As for bandwidth, that is always a tough process 
to manage. With bandwidth, you start with a given bucket size. It is up to that 
organization to find a healthy balance and not overfill the bucket because the network and 
the ability to information share will be impacted negatively. A healthy balance has to be 
applied thus another reason why some but not all SNMP data is shared on a network.  
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2. Scalability 
A second concern was the scalability of systems or applications being used to 
monitor or build the information sharing capability within an organization. Sometimes an 
organization may find itself in the perfect scenario where a tool, system, or software is 
working flawlessly; however, that quickly changes if the organization were to grow 
substantially. In these types of cases, an organization and the IT systems it uses must 
have the ability to grow with them, or their ability to share information will be negatively 
impacted. PMW 130 research revealed a future scalability issue concerning if they were 
going to be able to efficiently operate on future networks. If the programs matured any 
further, they would need a better infrastructure that considered all Navy organizations 
utilizing the platform and being able to handle the amount of data that would be 
generated. SHARKCAGE and NCSA are utilized by several organizations. A top concern 
for SHARKCAGE is that Linux boxes do not support the proper agents to provide the 
necessary information to various tools. This issue commonly presents itself because of 
poor design, configuration issues, or limitations of the employed IT system or service. 
PMW research revealed that a better infrastructure would be required to handle the 
increasing amount of data generated and analyzed. Without a foundation of anticipating 
future scalability to support an increase in data generation, tools such as SHARKCAGE 
and NCSA are at a disadvantage.  
3. Manning 
With the proper manning an organization can place itself in a posture that allows 
it to monitor, respond, and resolve in a timely manner increasing their information 
sharing capability. When an organization is not manned at the proper levels, this can 
negatively impact its ability to share information. After the visit to NCTAMS PAC, the 
research team visited the NMCI NOC which appeared to have very low manning in 
comparison to that of NCTAMS PAC. The level of manning was a concern because it can 
negatively impact effective real-time information sharing. Without proper manning, an 
organization may not be able to monitor, respond, and resolve issues for a large AOR, 
thus, impacting information sharing. This is a repeated issue with the armed forces in 
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general. To alleviate issues associated with manning, more emphasis can be placed on 
automation.  
4. Security 
Security should never be compromised to facilitate information sharing; however, 
Tanium does exactly that to accomplish the impressive results that it can. Tanium is one 
of the tools utilized by NNWC. The potential impact on a network utilizing Tanium is 
significant. If Tanium was ever breached, access to every asset would be successful and 
information would be compromised. Tanium and HBSS are different means to the same 
end. Both have the ability for endpoint detection. A user can extract and share 
information from both of them. However, Tanium is faster. Tanium achieves faster 
endpoint detection through identifying security compromises and violations of 
fundamental principles of cybersecurity. It is required to have a static open listening 
socket. It can be considered a managed botnet. It works fast and to get that speed a 
compromise in the security posture would have to be made. Tanium has to allow 
privileged host-to-host communications which are frowned upon. Tanium uses a peer-to-
peer protocol and runs in administrative space on each host utilizing a service account. 
No commands have been compromised as far as our team is aware, but if they ever are, 
an adversary has immediate quick control of every device on the network. Such an 
incident would be detrimental to an organization’s ability to information sharing among 
many other things. The vulnerabilities within Tanium are a part of its design and further 
exacerbated by running it as an in-band tool. As defined by Nevis (2007) p.2), 
The terms in-band and out-of-band generally refer to whether the solution 
sits in the flow of all network traffic, or out of the flow, analyzing instead 
only some of the live data streams. It has always been accepted that being 
in-band can offer better security and greater functionality than an out-of-
band approach, but could represent a performance bottleneck or a potential 
point-of-failure in a mission critical network. (p. 2) 
5. Access to Tools  
The fifth concern is the ability of an organization to access tools that would 
increase its ability to information share. NMNi is a commonly requested tool; however, 
there appear to be some issues with timely account creation with Perspecta, the contractor 
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responsible for account creations. Account creation can sometimes take months, only to 
have read-only access and most times, that access is removed inadvertently resulting in 
the watch stander being required to complete the process from the beginning again. With 
NMNi, a watch stander would be able to have an understanding of the state of the 
network through information sharing. Issues surround longer than usual or delayed 
account creation are due to processes at the approving authority and can be easily fixed if 
wanted. 
Various organizations run into issues when they have too many tools that are all 
focused on the same goal instead of a few central tools. If an organization has five or 
more applications/systems that facilitate information to every watch stander, that results 
in a delay in information sharing or a variety of unnecessary tools in the organizational 
network. NCDOC from initial research has a very interesting application of how they 
allowed new tools on their network. This directly impacted one of the contributing 
problems of having too many tools for efficient operations. They do not allow another 
vendor or organization to give them a new tool, and they actively try to reduce the 
amount of unnecessary or outdated tools under their organization through their Cyber 
Asset Reduction and Security (CARS) program. For an outside vendor to receive an 
Authority to Operate (ATO), they are requested to provide specified data feeds, Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS) data, firewall data, and agree to allow an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) on the network with a direct feed to NCDOC. Unless the stated 
requirements are met, then an ATO is not issued. This requirement tackles two areas of 
concern. It ensures that an organization is properly managing the tools, and makes sure 
they do not run into the issue where they are unable to get a complete picture because 
they do not have access to the data from a vendor or POR.  
B. POLICIES AND MANDATES 
Policies provide a high-level view and directive on what is allowable on a 
network. They are integral to information sharing between networks. In the process of 
ensuring free data flow, security also has to be taken into account for the networks. When 
looking at policies, the network engineer has to ensure all policies are aligned among the 
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Network Security Policy, Device Security, Internet Access, VPN, Port Communications, 
Wireless LAN, Remote Connection, or Firewall Rules. Ensuring well defined and 
effective policies for thousands of Navy Networks can be time and resource consuming.  
Site visits during this research included locations that were heavily involved in 
Network Operations, some with at least ten different subordinates. During the visits, it 
was determined that many of the networks did not communicate with each other because 
of policies. Policies in place hindered information sharing. Some policies denied sharing, 
some allowed it, and some just lacked the capability. When an organization has a large 
network, ideally its goal is for all of the pieces to work in harmony and not against each 
other. The weakest link affects the entire network. If an organization has policies that are 
not conducive to information sharing throughout the entire organization then information 
sharing is severely impacted. In most cases, policies are not correctly placed to ensure the 
free flow/sharing of data. 
Navy Networks face many barriers, such as not being able to share information 
from command to command or POR policies and the ability to share data. To accomplish 
complete free flow, policies on every level need to be in synchronized to ensure that the 
information can flow up and down the stack. An environment where all barriers are 
addressed and thus allowing the sharing of data across various organizations would create 
a positive environment that fosters information sharing. In the current setup, information 
sharing is fragmented. Ensuring overarching data sharing policies between PORs, 
vendors, and organizations to allow complete sharing of information would positively 
affect an organization’s ability to effectively and efficiently share information. 
Policies control a significant portion of a network. They can essentially be 
considered the gatekeeper. They are very complex and can cover several different areas 
from network operations, security, or privacy. There are various higher policies and 
guidance that prevent the sharing of information whether it is the responsibility to 
monitor the network, limit network tool integration, or poor communications with 
Perspectra and DISA. Policies and guidance prevent understanding of the Network 
Operational Environment (NOE) for the NOCs and NCTAMs. There is no possibility of 
39 
monitoring the environment for health and status without knowledge of the Network 
Operational Environment.  
AT&T is subcontracted by NMCI to provide data transport services to DISA. 
Because of this, AT&T has tools with the ability to write scripts and find information that 
Perspecta does not have access to or does not have an SLA to utilize. An example of a 
policy issue was evident when a technician informed NMCI of an issue via the NMCI 
helpdesk hotline, their only means for network interface or management. The findings 
were not elevated by NMCI despite the technician’s position as a government employee 
hired to troubleshoot those exact issues. The issue went unresolved for months until the 
technician put in enough tickets for the issue to be elevated to the appropriate level for 
correction. NMCI finally corrected the issue, although the operational impact to the 
network was already apparent. These actions demonstrate the policy issues where 
Perspecta is in a reactive state rather than a proactive state, despite the multiple tickets 
and phone calls on the part of the technician trying to be proactive.  
This case illustrates the “unwritten” procedures for how NCMI escalates its 
issues. It shows that despite position, expertise, and insight on a customer’s part, the 
policy agreements in place are what Perspecta is bound to follow. Given the process by 
which Perspecta escalates issues, the network is forced to operate in a reactive state, if 
not in a broken state, where their network operations staff cannot affect much change in 
the network/system management without running through an unreliable problem stove-
piped system. This process affects information sharing on the network. 
C. CONTRACTING 
Contracts have historically been a major issue for the Navy. Either the contract 
and SLAs are too broad or nonexistent to support organizational goals. IT contracts can 
be a government operated (GO) or a contractor operated (CO) network. The Navy is 
currently on the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet which is government owned, but contractor 
operated. The Marine Corps went a different route with the Marine Corps Enterprise 
Network (MCEN) which is government owned and government operated. The difference 
between CO and GO are evident in how both services can manage their networks. On the 
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Navy side, it is very costly and time-intensive for us to do anything to be done on the 
network, whereas, the Marine Corps can make changes in a much shorter time frame 
because they own and operate their network. The ability for timely changes in network 
operations is imperative for information sharing, security, and near real-time situational 
awareness. 
The ability to create and maintain a global enterprise health and status network 
could be greatly improved by improving the communications and coordination between 
the acquisition and the IT community. It is imperative that what an organization need is 
translated properly into a contractual agreement. It has to be a team effort with the correct 
people in the decision-making chain of approval. The end state should be the culmination 
of the enterprise goals, including constraints and expectations. For example, one of the 
U.S. Navy’s most recent IT acquisition is the Consolidated Afloat Networks and 
Enterprise Services (CANES) which according to their fact sheet, is the “Navy’s next-
generation tactical afloat network. CANES represents the consolidation and enhancement 
of five shipboard legacy network programs to provide the common computing 
environment for more than 40 command, control, intelligence, and logistics applications” 
(SPAWAR, 2011, para. 1). One prime example of something particular to CANES that 
could have been better addressed in the contract was its ability for the system to be 
rebooted. In a CANES environment, it takes in practice, about two hours to reboot the 
system, and while the system is rebooting, access to the multiple integrated systems is 
lost. This is a big problem for a warship in a contested environment. This example is only 
to show the disparity between what is needed and what is delivered.  
Contract issues can be easily fixed by ensuring key players in the IT field are at 
the negotiating table, details of SLAs are clearly defined, and each organization is aware 
of their responsibilities within the contract.  
D. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This section will summarize the research findings. A variety of tools were 
discussed. Most tools have a very specific purpose and are able to meet one or two uses; 
however, overall there is no centralized tool that promotes information sharing and is able 
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to effectively use it for a real-time picture. Information technologies that negatively affect 
FCC/C10F’s ability to share and receive timely information across the organization 
include: 
1) PORs not enabling SNMP V3 protocol on their systems to allow 
communication of health and status information. The disabling of SNMP V3 
protocols by PORs prevents systems from communicating health and status 
information in near real-time. The lack of system communication complicates 
near real-time analysis of the health and status information. This lack of 
communication negatively affects the sharing of timely information across the 
organization. Exploring how to share this data with minimal impact could 
positively impact information sharing.  
2) Organizations not placing a heavy emphasis on scalability. Various 
applications may be great for the current environment; however, future growth 
and expectations of the system/application can impact information sharing as 
the system/application may become less effective as the organization grows. 
Ensuring that scalability concerns are addressed in planning phases and/or 
before any contracts would positively impact information sharing.  
3) Tools, such as NMNi account access, are broken. Ensuring a flowing account 
creation process could positively impact an organization’s ability to share 
information by ensuring the proper access is given promptly.  
4) Security is vital in information sharing. Applications such as Tanium pose 
security risks that could negatively impact information sharing. Prioritizing 
security and the impact to an organizations ability to share information would 
positively impact information sharing  
5) A frequent concern was the number of tools for use by a watch stander. Being 
overwhelmed by tools in a stressful environment delays information sharing. 
Minimizing the number of applications/tools for use would positively impact 
information sharing.   
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Manning directly impacts an organization’s ability for effective information 
sharing. This is a long-standing issue for many organizations. Changes in manning or 
decreasing the number of interactions that require human interaction would positively 
impact information sharing.  
Policies within the FCC/C10F organization are vast and complex. This research 
did not go into detail on specific policies but instead took a broad approach to the issues 
that policies create. There are policies in place for internal and external processes, 
security, and need to know, just to name a few areas. When the policies of an 
organization do not align for all internal and external entities, the ability to share 
information is greatly impacted. Changes in these areas would positively impact the 
organization’s ability to share information. 
The FCC/C10F organization has a variety of support mechanisms in addition to 
active duty personnel. Contracts are frequent. If a specific contract does not cover the 
details to ensure an organization is receiving the support and data necessary to maintain 
its ability to share information, then it will be in an undesirable position. The Cyber Asset 
Reduction and Security (CARS) program is an excellent program and provides help in 






Organizations within FCC/C10F remain unable to utilize information sharing to 
compile an integrated enterprise network status information. At each command, a 
common concern is the sharing of information in real-time. This research examined the 
roles of tools and applications, policies, and contracting agreements in preventing and 
enabling information sharing. 
In the effort to pursue real-time information sharing to support a real-time 
network picture, commands find themselves inundated with various tools and 
applications. Many organizations touched on the fact that they had too many tools to log 
into to investigate issues, which proved to be very cumbersome on an operational watch 
floor. The Navy communications environment is very complex with a large number of 
assets spanning various security enclaves and areas of responsibility of the overall 
network. This complicates the objective. This research revealed that most tools are 
incomplete in that they can provide real-time information sharing about some data but not 
all data. Additionally, various POR systems and tools do not fully share information with 
other systems to allow effective and efficient information sharing. 
Lack of interoperability and isolated capabilities contribute greatly to an 
organization being unable to share information in real-time. As evident in each of the on-
site visits, tool usage can vary between each organization. Lack of interoperability has a 
negative impact due to multiple installations utilized by the DOD, such as SHIPMAN and 
Navy C5I, FRCB, sub-process, and embarked process, among others. Having so many 
different ways of installation, there is a lack of the centralized control needed to ensure 
that all these systems, if necessary, can exchange data with each other. This is the same 
issue with multiple PORs. Individually, they each have responsibilities, however, within 
each, they have their own tools, numerous data centers, differing levels of ownership, and 
ADCON/OPCON/MTE issues.  
How an organization is structured plays a huge role in how real-time information 
can be shared throughout it. A large hindrance to real-time information sharing is stove-
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piped network architectures and developments. The DOD has thousands of systems 
created by different organizations, contracted out to third parties, or applications that are 
no longer supported but are still being used by organizations. The same approaches 
recommended for FCC/C10F need to be applied externally to the FCC/C10F organization 
to support global real-time information sharing across various enclaves.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research looked at various military and civilian organizations and the issues 
that impacted real-time information sharing and how positive changes could impact the 
FCC/C10F organization’s ability for information sharing. To move towards efficient and 
effective information sharing to facilitate an integrated COP of network health and status, 
many changes need to be made. 
The organizational and network architecture both need to be able to facilitate real-
time information sharing. Policies across the fleet should support and not restrict 
information sharing due to organizations being dependent on one another for optimal 
performance and achieving mission objectives. 
It was very evident that some of the issues plaguing real-time information sharing 
included old, antiquated systems. This is addressed by transitioning from legacy systems 
to IP to provide real-time data to NETOPS systems via information sharing. This research 
supports the recommendation that the reduction of old legacy systems allows the 
organization to utilize newer systems with newer capability geared toward better 
information sharing.  
Additionally, the approach to how we deploy technology should be revisited. 
When deploying technologies for such a large organization, a system of systems 
approach that takes into consideration the current and future environments as well as the 
consequences of such changes over time should be of priority. 
Information sharing currently requires system administrator privileges. On the 
current network, that is government owned (GO) and contractor operated (CO), 
commands such as NNWC may have to insert themselves more regarding network 
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administration, as they own the process. In reviewing the information available, it 
appears that the Navy organization has more flexibility to do things within the current 
NGEN contract. The lines of responsibility and confines should be clearly drawn and 
understood by all entities. GO includes the network, hardware, and administration. It 
should be administered via appropriate lines of communication. CO should be operated 
under dictated constraints. Future government contracts should require the ability for 
organizations to have the option to self-monitor their networks. More often than not, 
organizations have found themselves restricted in information sharing because they do 
not have access to monitor their network and data. 
A final recommendation is that applications requiring compromises to security 
postures be managed in an out-of-band capacity. Placing an otherwise great application 
like Tanium as far out-of-band as possible could open up additional possibilities of the 
application with lesser security implications to a vital organization. 
In conclusion, global information sharing is possible on a GO/CO network. The 
risk has to be taken and accepted. The Navy cyber team is highly intelligent and capable 
and with the right tools and directions, we can share information globally to and from the 
entire FCC/C10F organization.  
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